The General Medical Council's (GMC) purpose is to protect, promote and maintain the health and safety of the public by ensuring proper standards in the practice of medicine. To support that purpose, the GMC has four main regulatory functions: registration (which, in future, will include revalidation); education and training; standards and ethics; and the fitness-to-practise procedures (sometimes misleadingly labelled disciplinary procedures).
The fitness-to-practise procedures seem guaranteed to polarize opinions; over the years, there have been criticisms from both sides of the yawning divide that separates those who believe the GMC is too lenient and those who believe it is too harsh. Neither caricature is accurate, as evidenced by the outcomes of appeals and other referrals to the High Court. As with all activities based on human judgements, errors are made but the numbers are very small and they do not reflect systemic bias. The GMC is committed to having processes and procedures that are fair, objective, transparent and free from discrimination.
Nevertheless, some criticisms of the fitness-topractise procedures have been justified. The procedures that operated in the 1990s and in the early part of the 2000s were no longer fit for purpose. That is why the GMC launched a programme of fundamental review in 2000 and introduced reformed procedures in November 2004. It is also why, at the Shipman Inquiry in November 2003, the GMC frankly recognized past deficiencies in three areas -operational effectiveness; consistency and quality of decision-making; and the architecture of the procedures.
Other criticisms are not justified. Some reflect a historical rather than a current perspective; some are based on misunderstanding; and some are partisan. They include that the GMC bears down unfairly on particular groups of doctors, for example paediatricians; or that the GMC is illequipped to investigate allegations of research misconduct. Both are contradicted by the facts; and neither is substantiated by the CNEP case. This is not to say that the GMC did not make serious errors in relation to the CNEP allegations. The GMC has acknowledged that there were mistakes and has apologised for them. But those mistakes do not justify the claims sometimes made.
The GMC first received allegations about the CNEP trial in 1997. The allegations included: that consent had not been properly obtained; that some of the babies had not been suitable for inclusion in the trial; and that the trial had not been conducted properly and safely. Although the CNEP case ran beyond the introduction of the reformed procedures, in November 2004, it continued, for legal reasons and all practical purposes, to be subject to the legislation in force when the allegations were received in 1997. To understand why this is significant, it is necessary to look at the architecture.
The fitness-to-practise procedures are governed by the Medical Act 1983 (as amended from time to time) and by statutory Rules. Before November 2004, the procedures had three stages -screening; preliminary proceedings; and an inquiry conducted by the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC). The Rules determined the nature of the test to be applied at each stage. The GMC's interpretation and application of the law are subject to the oversight of the courts, whether by way of judicial review or appeal.
The Rules also provided that the complainant was a party to the proceedings and was, therefore, entitled to pursue the complaint against the doctor. This included a right, which was exercised by the complainants in the CNEP case, to instruct the legal team and to control the conduct of the case, including their choice of expert witnesses. There are no corresponding provisions for complainant cases in the reformed procedures.
Within the first stage, the allegations were considered by a medical screener who, at the time, by law had to be a medical member of the Council of the GMC. The screener decided whether the case should proceed to the Preliminary Proceedings Committee (PPC). A decision not to refer the allegations to the PPC had to be agreed by a lay screener, who was also a Council member.
The presumption in the Rules was that the allegations should be referred by the screener to the PPC unless 'it appears to the screener that the matter need not proceed further'. It was a test that screened out, not a test that screened in. Mr Justice Lightman (R v GMC ex parte Toth [2000] 1 WLR 2209) had said:
'The role of the screener is a narrow one. It is to filter out from the formally correct complaints . those which he is satisfied (for some sufficient and substantial reason) need not proceed further. For this purpose he must be satisfied of a negative, namely that the normal course of the complaint proceeding to the PPC need not be followed.'
Within the second stage, the allegations were considered by the PPC. The role of the PPC was to decide if the allegations should be subject to an inquiry conducted by the PCC. The test in the Rules was whether the matter 'ought to be referred for inquiry by the PCC .'.
The PPC's discretion was also limited. Again in the words of Mr Justice Lightman, 'The PPC may examine whether the complaint has any real prospect of being established; . and may refuse to refer if satisfied that the real prospect is not present, but it must do so with the utmost caution . It is not its role to resolve conflicts of evidence . In the case of the PPC (as in the case of the screener) any doubt should be resolved in favour of the investigation proceeding.' The limited role of the PPC in resolving issues of evidence proved to be significant in the CNEP case.
Within the third stage, the allegations were considered by the PCC, which conducted an inquiry. The PCC decided whether the allegations had been proved; whether those found proved constituted serious professional misconduct; and, when serious professional misconduct was found, the nature of any sanction to be imposed on the doctor's registration.
Having received the CNEP related allegations in 1997, the GMC was slow to take effective action. In January 1999, the NHS Executive commissioned a report from Professor Rod Griffiths. The GMC concluded that it should await publication of that report before making any decisions on the allegations. The report was published in May 2000; and it contained criticisms of the CNEP trial. Separately, the Trust had commissioned a report from Professor Sir David Hull, whose report was delivered to the Trust in December 2000.
The medical screener decided that the CNEP allegations should be referred to the PPC. This was inevitable given the screening test to be applied. On 16 January 2002, the PPC decided that the threshold required for reference to the PCC had not been reached. The complainants protested and, on review in September 2002, it emerged that the screener had not been presented with all the relevant material when making the screening decision. Consequently, the PPC had not been presented with a complete picture. The decisions were set aside; and the medical screener, having considered all the material, again referred the allegations to the PPC.
By this stage, the GMC had made three mistakes. First, it had taken too long before making the first screening decision. Second, the first screening decision and the PPC decision were defective because relevant material had not been taken into account. Third, it took too long to make the second screening decision, based on all the available material. Over six years had passed from receipt of the original complaint. The GMC has apologized for the mistakes made and for the delays.
In February 2004, the PPC again decided not to refer the allegations to the PCC, and the complainants were notified of this decision on 12 March 2004. The complainants sought judicial review of the PPC's decision. Following Mr Justice Pitchford's refusal of that claim, in December 2004, the complainants were granted permission to appeal. The appeal was heard in June 2005.
In December 2005, the Court of Appeal, by a two to one majority, quashed the PPC's decision 1 and remitted the case for consideration by a differently constituted PPC. One of the grounds was that the PPC had exceeded its proper function in placing substantial reliance on the BMJ article by Hey Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine and Chalmers, which had criticized the Griffiths Report. Lord Justice Jonathan Parker said:
'It is one thing to evaluate the available evidential material in order to determine whether in its opinion such material appears to raise a question whether the practitioner has committed serious professional misconduct, but (as it seems to me) quite another to purport to resolve disputed factual issues. I consider that . the PPC went further than was necessary for the purpose of deciding whether the material before it raised the Rule 11(2) question. In so doing, it trespassed on an area which was properly the province of the PCC, should the case be referred to it.'
As a result of the judicial review and the appeal, almost two further years had passed since the screener's decision in January 2004 to refer the allegations to the PPC.
It took further time to comply with the Court of Appeal's directions. A differently constituted PPC decided in November 2006 to refer the allegations for inquiry by the PCC. Given the reasons for the Court of Appeal's quashing of the earlier PPC decision, this is not, perhaps, surprising.
The PCC inquiry was held between May and July 2008. Having heard the evidence of the complainants and their witnesses, the panel accepted the argument advanced by Counsel for the doctors that insufficient evidence had been adduced to support a finding of serious professional misconduct. The doctors were, consequently found not guilty of serious professional misconduct.
It has been argued that the eventual outcome, in July 2008, demonstrates that the PPC was wrong, in November 2006, to refer the allegations for inquiry by the PCC. That is based on a misunderstanding. Unfortunate though it was for the doctors concerned, the limited function of the PPC, under the pre 2004 Rules which continued to apply, did not entitle it to trespass on the role of the PCC. The implication of the Court of Appeal's decision is not that the GMC should have closed the case earlier but rather the reverse.
It has also been argued that the CNEP case demonstrates the GMC's inability, when there is alleged research misconduct, to fulfil the required investigative function in a transparently fair and independent way. Again, that is based on a misunderstanding. The GMC certainly made mistakes. However, those mistakes were tardiness and a failure to heed the limited discretion available to screeners and the PPC under the statutory Rules. They were not the result of ineffective investigation. There may be an argument for a UK organization equipped to investigate any allegation of research misconduct but it is not made by the GMC's handling of the CNEP case.
Nevertheless, doctors and others are entitled to ask whether the GMC would or could make the same mistakes again. The confident answer is no.
The reformed fitness-to-practise procedures, introduced in November 2004 after extensive consultation, have two stages -the Investigation Stage and the Adjudication Stage.
Within the Investigation Stage, allegations are considered by medical and lay case examiners who have been recruited by open competition and trained for the role. In deciding whether to refer allegations to the Adjudication Stage, they apply a 'realistic prospect' test. The question is whether, if established, the facts would demonstrate that the doctor's fitness to practise is impaired to a degree justifying action on registration. It reflects not a probability but rather a genuine (not remote or fanciful) possibility. It is in no-one's interest for cases to be referred for inquiry when they are bound to fail. On the other hand, cases that raise a genuine issue of fitness to practise are for an adjudication panel to decide.
There is detailed guidance for case examiners, including the criteria they must apply, and this guidance is published on the GMC's website. 2 Case examiners have access to all the material available at the point of decision, and the full decision is disclosed to all parties, including the reasons for the decision.
Within the Adjudication Stage, inquiries are conducted by fitness-to-practise panels whose members are recruited by open competition and trained for the role. Panels decide whether the allegations have been proved, whether the doctor's fitness to practise is impaired, and when fitness to practise is impaired, the sanction to be imposed on the doctor's registration. Panels take into account the GMC's Indicative Sanctions Guidance, which is published on the GMC's website. 3 Much has changed since the CNEP allegations were lodged with the GMC in 1997, and the causes of the GMC's mistakes have been addressed in all three areas identified for the Shipman Inquiry -
The Stoke CNEP Saga -a view from the General Medical Council operational effectiveness, consistency and quality of decision-making, and architecture. A decade ago, the PCC typically considered 40-60 new cases each year. Fitness-to-practise panels now consider 200-300 new cases each year. Despite this huge expansion, or perhaps in response to it, the GMC's operational performance and the consistency and quality of decision-making stand comparison with any regulator.
The GMC's mistakes in relation to the CNEP allegations were not related to the quality of the investigation. Nevertheless, an obvious question is whether it would help, when there is alleged research misconduct, if there was a body, separate from the GMC, with the expertise needed to mount a timely and effective investigation of the facts?
On the face of it, the existence of such a body may do no harm and it may do some good. However, the claimed advantages, or some of them, could prove illusory.
A fitness-to-practise panel has three tasks: determine the facts; determine whether fitness to practise is impaired; and, if fitness to practise is impaired, determine the sanction on registration. Determining the facts is what takes the time -and rightly so, given what is at stake. Panels often have to choose between two or more conflicting accounts, sometimes based on hazy recollection and imperfect records.
In very specific circumstances, the GMC is not required to put allegations to strict proof -broadly speaking, criminal convictions and determinations by other regulators, which, if properly certified, are accepted as fact.
In theory, it would be possible to add a third category that could be accepted without strict proof -facts found by a (new) competent authority charged with investigating allegations of research misconduct. However, even if that was acceptable in principle, it could simply shift the problem. The (new) competent authority's processes and procedures would need to provide all the safeguards, and rights of representation, that are present in criminal and regulatory proceedings. A professional's right to pursue their profession is a civil right and any process that threatens this civil right has to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights.
No doubt it could be argued that, even if the (new) competent authority's findings of fact could be challenged in front of a fitness-to-practise panel, they would, nevertheless, assist the case examiners, within the Investigation Stage, to decide whether there was a realistic prospect of finding fitness to practise impaired. Thus, fewer doctors would be required to appear unnecessarily before a fitness-to-practise panel.
This is an argument for effective investigation before the case examiners' decision: it is not an argument for a new body. The shift to effective investigation was reflected in the reformed procedures introduced in November 2004. Most cases considered by the case examiners are not referred for adjudication. The majority are concluded without further action, or with a formal warning that is placed on the doctor's registration record, or through consensual disposal when the doctor is willing to give and comply with undertakings as part of a programme of retraining or remediation.
Regulation is dynamic and must continue to develop in order to command the confidence and support of key interests. An effective regulator must learn from experience and be willing to try to foresee, and to meet, the legitimate expectations of those whose interests it is there to protect. The procedures in place today are substantially more effective, and fairer, than those they replaced. There is, however, no room for complacency and the GMC continues to encourage and to welcome constructive debate about what more might be done. That is why the GMC is consulting this year on further changes to the fitness-to-practise procedures, to ensure that they remain fit for purpose. 4, 5 
